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The Implications of Alternative Dispute
Resolution Processes for Decisionmaking
in Administrative Disputes
Wallace Warfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
The universe of federal administrative procedure, as well as the
kinds of disputes generated in this universe, is particularly challeng-
ing when applying the comparatively new approaches of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR). Within this definition fall such techniques
as problem-solving negotiation, mediation, facilitation, factfinding, ar-
bitration, the use of settlement judges, and minitrials. Unlike com-
munity disputes, where there are no set rules of procedure and
parties have no formal or, at best, an informal relationship, adminis-
trative disputes usually arise from a base of formal rules and proce-
dures affecting agencies with functional lines of authority. Moreover,
these agencies' relationships with individuals and private organiza-
tions that utilize or are affected by their activities are usually defined
in great detail. Therefore, in crafting alternative techniques to re-
solve administrative disputes, one must be mindful of this formal
structure and the reality of its institutional limitations.
For the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS),
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an independent federal agency chartered in 1964 to identify causes of
waste, delay, and inefficiency in government procedures and recom-
mend improvements, examining the uses and application of ADR to
resolve procedural disputes is consistent with and has become a ma-
jor part of ACUS's mandate. Since 1982, ACUS has provided re-
search and guidance in this area to Congress, the courts, and federal
agencies.'
As Visiting Fellow with ACUS, I have had a unique opportunity to
study dispute mechanisms designed for various types of administra-
tive activity. The procedure for handling government contract dis-
putes provides a graphic illustration of the need for reform in an area
grown burdensome with reflexive litigation and encumbered
decisionmaking.
II. BACKGROUND ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES
Prior to enactment of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA),2
the management of government contract disputes was a Balkanized
landscape of procedures awash in numerous contract clauses, agency
regulations, judicial decisions, and statutory provisions. The CDA
was intended to standardize these procedures on a government-wide
basis, giving sole authority to agency contracting officers to enter into
and administer government contracts. Interestingly, the CDA was
also intended to encourage simpler, faster decisions on contract
claims. Figure 13 depicts the contracts disputes process today.
As Figure 1 suggests, there are a number of points in the system
where the contracting officer, as a decisionmaker for the govern-
ment, and the private contractor-decisionmaker are provided an op-
portunity to negotiate. Indeed, the CDA was designed to streamline
litigiously provocative procedures and encourage settlement. Ironi-
cally, after just ten years of existence, the CDA's procedure has itself
become bogged down by: tying up scarce government resources, cir-
cumscribing the profit margin of contractors, and ultimately, depriv-
ing the public of many of the services its taxes are paying for.
III. ADVANTAGES OF ADR TO THE CONTRACTS DISPUTES SYSTEM
There can be no disagreement that contract disputes in many pro-
curement agencies are growing. Between 1976 and 1983, the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the largest board with
1. See D. Riggs & E. Dorininey, Federal Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 125 (1987).
2. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383-2391 (1978)
(codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1982).
3. Reprinted from JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 895 (2d ed. 1985).
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37 administrative judges, saw its pending disputes grow from 1031 to
1695. By 1988, the number of cases coming before the ASBCA had
escalated to 2400 a year or roughly 65 cases per judge.4 The increas-
ing number of disputes initiated by the contractor or the government,
in and of itself, is not surprising. Government contracting is big busi-
ness; in the Department of Defense (with its proliferation of sophisti-
cated weapons and necessary support systems), increasingly complex
disputes, arising out of the interpretation of technological nuances
and the capability of contractors to meet specified objectives, would
seem to be the norm.
What is disturbing are the number of disputes that are reaching
the formal hearing stage. Defenders of the status quo are quick to
observe that eighty percent or more of procurement disputes settle.
However, as measured by the effective use of public and private re-
sources involved in disputes, many of these elude the definition of
quality settlements. Frequently, these disputes settle on the "court-
house steps" after a prolonged period of legal maneuvering during
which a large amount of time and financial resources have been
expended.
Far too many disputes which could have been resolved earlier in
the decisionmaking process do not settle at all. For example, a small
contractor initiated a claim for a contract adjustment that took eight-
een months to reach the ASBCA for a hearing. The claim was de-
nied at that level, but the contractor persisted, appealing the board
decision to the court of appeals where it was denied with prejudice
and returned to the board a full two years after the complaint was
filed. During this period, the contractor hired and dismissed an attor-
ney, attempted a pro se argument before the board, and then hired a
new attorney to handle his appeal to the circuit court. This could not
have been cost-effective for a claim that amounted to less than
$20,000. Nor did this seem to be a particularly good candidate for an
argument based on rights. Unfortunately, this is an all too familiar
scenario.
Occasionally, a contractor will simply give in to a contracting of-
ficer's decision, operating under the philosophy "you win some, you
lose some." This breeds cynicism and a collateral philosophy of hit-
ting the government's "deep pockets" with some other component of
the contract or when a new contract has been awarded.
It would appear that greater use of ADR techniques at appropriate
points along the dispute continuum could be instrumental in reduc-
ing the backlog of cases at the agency board level. Government trial
4. This is probably a conservative estimate since the ASBCAChairman does not
hear cases on a regular basis.
[Vol. 16: S93, 1989] Administrative Disputes
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
counsel and administrative judges, then, would have more time to
concentrate on cases where issues of precedent are truly important.
Calling for greater use of ADR techniques to resolve government
contract disputes5 in no way is meant to suggest that these devices
are an alternative to the lawyers and judges who are a part of the
system. These officials, particularly on the public sector side, are
critical to the credibility of the process. Rather, the various forms of
dispute resolution mentioned above should serve, wherever possible,
as preferable options, or tools for those who hold these positions.
Perhaps the more appropriate term for the use of these techniques
within the structure of administrative disputes is consensual dispute
resolution. This terminology more accurately reflects not only the
kinds of agreements reached between disputants, but the way parties
interact within the resolution framework. Consensual dispute reso-
lution represents a paradigm shift away from traditional methods of
resolving disputes to more innovative techniques. The results can
shorten the protracted nature of these disputes and curb their recidi-
vist tendencies.
IV. OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF ADR TECHNIQUES
Given the opportunities for settlement built into the system, why
are more ADR-assisted settlements not taking place? A review of
the contract disputes system suggests a number of opposing forces ar-
rayed on both sides.
On the government side, particularly within the armed services
contracting shops, many hold the view that government procurement
is "awards driven." Because of the huge amounts of money appropri-
ated for defense and defense-related projects, there is a great deal of
pressure on contracting officers to award contracts. Consequently,
performance appraisal systems are geared more to the size of con-
tracts awarded and funds obligated, than they are to the efficient res-
olution of disputes.
Despite the authority vested in government contracting officers by
the CDA, many experts and contracting officers feel this authority
has been eroded over the years by new actors coming in to the pro-
curement system with various oversight roles. The following is a
summary of the impact that some of these positions have on the deci-
5. See generally ACUS, Alternatives for Resolving Government Contract Dis-
putes: Recommendation 87-11 (Dec. 18, 1987).
sionmaking flexibility of the contracting officer:6
(1) Although the contracting officer has sole authority to enter
into a contract, frequently only the government engineers have the
technical expertise necessary to understand the contract's require-
ments. In many instances, a contracting officer's intuitive judgment
about the validity of a claim is subjugated to, or overridden by, the
engineer's opinion.
(2) Agency auditors have been given more responsibility to ex-
amine such things as defective pricing, and contractors' proposals,
and are increasingly involved in giving advice and participating in ne-
gotiations. Clearly, this can have a chilling effect on contracting of-
ficers who might otherwise be inclined to engage in interest-based or
problem solving negotiations with a contractor.
(3) Certifying and disbursing officers have the responsibility for
managing a procurement agency's funds. Absent a close working re-
lationship with this individual, a contracting officer can never be
sure, in negotiations with a contractor, if an agreement around a con-
tract adjustment would be upheld. This not only undercuts the valid-
ity of his negotiating position, but it could possibly create ethical
problems if he cannot deliver on an agreement when a disbursing of-
ficer indicates the money is not available. At the least, this rein-
forces the contractor's sense of right and ensures that the dispute
will not be resolved at this level of consensual decisionmaking, but
instead appealed to the board.
(4) The relationship between contracting officers and government
attorneys, while not a new configuration, can still be problematic in
efforts to bring about more ADR-enhanced settlements. Attorneys
attached to procurement shops have the responsibility for defending
the government's position in contract disputes before Boards of Con-
tract Appeals. In some agencies where contracting officers are of
equal stature to attorneys, 7 problems are reduced. In other shops,
however, attorneys report directly to senior policymakers. Their in-
fluence with high-level decisionmakers and their rank in procure-
ment agencies, coupled with requirements in some agencies that
contracting officers consult with attorneys before rendering a deci-
sion, can inhibit more effective settlements at the contracting officer
level.
From a training perspective, many contracting officers have only a
passing acquaintance with negotiating techniques, and what little
there is relates to contract negotiations rather than dispute negotia-
6. For a detailed account of the role of a Department of Defense contracting of-
ficer, see ABA Section on Public Contract Law, The DOD Contracting Officer: A Re-
port by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Role of DOD Contracting Officers (1987).
7. Contracting officers hold the rank of Colonel in the Army Corps of Engineers.
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tions. Even where experienced contracting officers have learned
through trial-and-error negotiating techniques for resolving contract
disputes, many procurement agencies have not devised in-service
training programs allowing these skills to be passed on to
apprentices.
The combined impact of these factors has created an atmosphere in
a number of agencies where risk-taking in support of problem-solving
negotiations is discouraged. As one contracting officer put it: "If you
are going to lose, don't issue the final decision."
From the vantage point of the private contractor as well, govern-
ment procurement has roadblocks to collaborative dispute resolution.
Some of the reasons that have been cited include:
(1) In some corporations, the so-called "bottom line" is a compel-
ling reason not to negotiate. Vice-presidents for a production compo-
nent are frequently authorized a profit line for a given quarter.
Contract negotiations with the government could result in reduced
profit margins, resulting in a negative profit and loss statement for
that quarter. In this scenario, it is often easier to pass the decision
along to the litigating department or stall until the particular man-
ager has moved on.
(2) Negotiating is not easy. A narrow view of decisionmaking
choices may suggest that turning the whole matter over to outside
counsel to litigate the dispute is a lot simpler even if it does infer an
ostrich-like approach to dealing with the issue.
(3) Sometimes lawyers recognize the need to settle, but the client,
out of sheer obstinacy or a feeling that he or she has been treated un-
fairly, will refuse.
V. THE ROLE OF DECISIONMAKING IN THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESS
If proponents of the use of ADR are to be successful in getting
these techniques into the contract disputes system, understanding the
way organizations make decisions will be a critical first step. Most
decisionmaking theorists agree that the process for making decisions
is as reflected in Figure 2.8 From the standpoint of how ADR could
influence decisionmaking, steps 2 through 5 are the most critical.
8. TERRENCE R. MITCHELL, PEOPLE IN ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING THEIR
BEHAVIOR 256 (1978).
Figure 2
Step 1: Set Goals -- Step 2: Problem Recognition -* Step 3: Information
Search - Step 4: Generating Alternative Solutions - Step 5: Choice of Ac-
tion - Step 6: Implementation.
In public and private organizations, choices for decisions are fre-
quently affected by the environment. Within the organization, the
environment can be characterized as those individuals, directed func-
tional activities, and informal relationships that influence the way
work is accomplished. This is often referred to as the organizational
culture. But environmental influences can be external as well. Such
entities as Congress, the courts, and the public can act individually or
collectively to pressure and influence organizations-especially gov-
ernment organizations.
These combined environmental forces tend to confer roles on deci-
sionmakers who, in turn, make decisions out of a sense of role obliga-
tion. The CDA does not include any suggestions on dispute
resolution by contracting officers. In more than one instance, courts,
mindful of such role confusion, have supported the neutrality of con-
tracting officers. 9 The environment as a driving force, however, cre-
ates a sense of role obligation and role expectation, thus narrowing
choices for decisions and effectively overriding the courts' position.
In this climate, dispute negotiations handled by contracting officers
tend to be highly competitive, revolving around zero-sum strategies.
Just as there are negotiating styles, there are decision styles. One
theory uses what is called the "garbage can model"10 to describe or-
ganizational decision style. In the garbage can model, any organiza-
tion has a closed universe of problems, choices, and solutions that are
continually matched (or mismatched) to make decisions. No matter
what the problem, the organization rarely goes beyond the bounda-
ries of this universe to attempt to arrive at new ways of resolving the
problem. Thus, step 3, the "Information Search," as described in Fig-
ure 2, is effectively constricted.
Some decisions are made by flightl--difficult choices are cast aside
until a desirable choice hovers into view. This differs from the gar-
bage can model because it suggests that organizations marked by this
decision style are at least aware of choice options. They simply do
not explore them. In managing contract procurement disputes, this
would be exemplified in private as well as public organizations.
Herbert Simon, a psychologist who has studied decisionmaking,
adds to the above examples by observing that decisionmaking is af-
9. See, e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 550, 89 F. Supp.
545 (1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 898 (1950), reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 923 (1951).
10. See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, AMBIGUITY & CHOICE IN
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1979).
11. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, supra note 10, at 33.
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fected by what he calls "bounded rationality. ' '12 Rather than explore
a full range of alternatives, the decisionmaker chooses from among
those which are comfortable. An individual or organization's values
and experiences play a major role in shaping the selection process.
The result is what Simon calls "satisficing"-making limited, expedi-
ent choices based on a biased set of outcomes and probabilities.13
Of course, no organization reflects exclusively one decision style or
another. Organizations tend to be a mixture of several decision styles
frequently operating at different levels of hierarchy. Nonetheless,
for organizations that are in a state of overload, where time con-
straints are a major factor, the above mentioned styles will emerge as
characteristic. Whatever 'the decision style, it becomes a part of the
organization's culture, a knowledge of how things get done-a way of
interpreting events. This in turn affects decisionmaking--anticipation
about the consequences of one's actions are used to choose among
current alternatives.
VI. USING ADR TO CREATE BETTER DECISIONMAKING MODELS
As noted, there are a number of places in the contracts disputes
process for negotiated settlements to take place. The accompanying
decision choices range from very informal opportunities to initiate di-
alogue prior to the final decision of the contracting officer, to more
formal decision forums that take place at the board level or United
States Claims Court. 14
If ADR is viewed solely as dispute resolution at its most reactive
point along the contract disputes continuum, then an appropriate fo-
rum for the settlement would be at the board level. A judge acting in
a settlement capacity could encourage or assist parties in reaching a
negotiated solution; indeed, ACUS recommendationsl5 and subse-
quent training have supported this approach. This can have a posi-
tive impact on the decisionmaking process, because the judge, acting
in a settlement role, is in a position to encourage the parties to more
fully explore step 4, "Generating Alternative Solutions."
The problem with resolving disputes at this level, however, is that
12. See supra note 8, at 265.
13. Id. at 266.
14. See United States Claims Court, Gen. Order No. 13 (Apr. 15, 1987). This court,
itself, has begun to utilize ADR.
15. See supra note 5, at 4-5; see also E. Crowell & C. Pou, Jr., Report to the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States on Appealing Government Contract Deci-
sions: Reducing the Cost & Delay of Procurement Litigation (Jan. 1988).
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positions have solidified; issues in dispute are highly distributive in
nature. If, as Lax says, negotiations have two parts--creating values
and claiming values 6-then this becomes very much a claiming fo-
rum. Given the well-known concern of administrative judges about
abrogating due process, this would tend to inhibit a more active role
in creating values-a dynamic whose origins lie in the Generating Al-
ternative Solutions stage of decisionmaking. Additionally, while a
systematic approach to use judges in a settlement role will reduce
some of the pressure on the court's docket and the time and expense
of attorneys, it is far better to have fewer of these cases reaching the
board level in the first place.
A more proactive, problem-solving approach advocates dealing with
the dispute at an earlier stage where decisions that created the dis-
pute were made. A contracting officer has the opportunity to negoti-
ate settlement pre/post final decision. The best opportunity for the
contracting officer to take full advantage of his capacity as a third-
party neutral, however, is in the pre-final decision stage. Positions
are more flexible and creating solutions can be more readily identi-
fied. The contracting officer becomes the mediator, exploring a full
range of settlement opportunities with disputants. He has a unique
capability to liberate decisionmaking at the Information Search step
because of how he is situated in the disputes process. Attached to the
procurement shop, he has frequent contact with engineers, auditors,
attorneys, and others on the government side. He has access to tech-
nical information and knows the organizational culture. He also is
familiar with the world and culture of private contractors. Assuming
he is adequately trained in ADR techniques, he brings a commanding
set of knowledge and skills to the table.
Private neutrals have a role in the contracts disputes process as
well. They best serve the system at later stages of the dispute, after
the contracting officer's final decision, where other settlement reme-
dies have been exhausted. As an example, private neutrals might
serve a court-annexed procedure such as a minitrial or as a mediator
during the ninety-day time period when the final decision of the con-
tracting officer is appealed to the board, or during the twelve-month
period, if the ruling is appealed to the claims court. Although the
minitrial typically takes place further along the dispute continuum,
part of its appeal is that negotiations are handled by principals fairly
high on the decisionmaking chain. These individuals have more flex-
ibility to devise innovative solutions (creating values at step 4 in the
decisionmaking process) than others constrained to more narrowly
16. For a further discussion, see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MAN-
AGER AS NEGOTIATOR chs. 2, 5-6 (1986).
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defined roles.17
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
If resolving the dispute at emergent stages is the preferred option,
how is the contracting officer freed from the debilitating organiza-
tional and environmental influences discussed earlier? One approach
is through educating those who influence the external environment,
such as members of Congress. The ACUS has been active in this
area via an ADR bill submitted in the 100th Congress.1S While the
bill was not passed, there is a strong possibility that it will be resub-
mitted in the current session.
High on the agenda for stimulating change would be an executive
order, supporting and encouraging the use of ADR to resolve admin-
istrative disputes.19 This would underscore the intent of the execu-
tive branch to make ADR a key component of government reform
and serve notice on both sides of the fence that resource-wasting con-
tract disputes will not be accepted as "business as usual." The execu-
tive order would set the tone for changing the decisionmaking
atmosphere in government procurement agencies.
With such an order in place, an available agent for change would
be the report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, 20 commonly known as the Packard Commission, which
contained a number of detailed recommendations for revising the
procurement process. While this report did not deal specifically with
the management of contract disputes, observations drawn from ex-
amples of successful procurement experiences provide clues to how
contract disputes could be more expeditiously resolved or even
avoided. It was recommended that contract procurement be handled
by small teams of highly competent people who would stay with the
project to a certain point of completion. In effect, a team-building re-
lationship is established where intraorganizational competition is
transformed into a consensus-building effort to achieve the comple-
17. See L. Edelman & F. Carr, The Mini-Trial: An Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedure, in ACUS, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 231 (1987); P. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures & the Administrative Process, in ACUS, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL
AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239 (1987).
18. S. 2274, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 12, 1988) (The Administrative Dispute Res-
olution Act).
19. See supra note 5, at 3.
20. PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, A QUEST FOR
EXCELLENCE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (June 1986).
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tion of a project. Within a functional unit of this make-up, the con-
tracting officer should be recognized and respected as the mediator,
with support for the role coming from the senior program manager.
Arguably, there is an inherent role conflict with the contracting of-
ficer being the primary contract negotiator for the government, and
subsequently, attempting to mediate. In a team-building approach,
individuals are encouraged to air their concerns about a project
before the contract is let. Under the guidance of the program man-
ager, consensus is often achieved. This has the effect of removing the
threat of lose/lose outcomes for the contracting officer when faced
with the prospect of becoming the neutral decisionmaker. As media-
tor, the contracting officer is freer to explore opportunities to create
values within the dispute framework and encourage interest-based
negotiations.
The government attorney should be made an ex officio member of
the team. Initially, the attorney should be briefed on the project's
objective; once the contractor has been selected, the attorney should
meet with corporate counsel to anticipate where disputes might arise.
This encourages a predisposition to negotiate and establishes a
fallback for settlement if earlier negotiations fail.
VIII. CONCLUSION
ADR should not be considered a panacea that will resolve all the
ills of government contracting or any other administrative procedure.
Nor should the methodologies be thought of as so dauntingly Prome-
thean that those in central decisionmaking positions will be adverse
to using them. ADR should be another way of recognizing a finite
universe containing limited resources. With committed leadership in
the public and private sector, much can be accomplished to revise the
approaches utilized to manage disputes.
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